Biography of Imam Al-Sanusi

He is Imam Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Yusuf ibn Umar ibn Shu'ayb Al-Sanusi Al-Tilmisani Al-Ash'ari. Al-Sanusi is an attribution to the Berber city of Sanusa in Morocco. Al-Tilmisani is an attribution to the North Algerian city of Tilmisan, also known as Tlemcen.

Imam Al-Sanusi was born in Tilmisan in the ninth century. It is differed on the exact date of his birth, but it was approximately 832 A.H. He was born into a family of knowledge and righteousness. He was from the blessed family of the Messenger ﷺ from his mother's side from the lineage of Imam Hussayn, the blessed grandson of the Prophet ﷺ. Imam Al-Sanusi's student and biographer, Shaykh Al-Malali remarked that Imam Al-Sanusi's father was a man of exceptional piety, humility, scrupulousness, and kindness. His father busied himself with teaching children Qur'an.

Imam Al-Sanusi took from all of the teachers in his vicinity which was ripe with scholars at the highest levels of every science. He took the seven modes of recitation with a complete authority to transmit (Ijaza Mutlaqa 'Aamma) all of the recensions of the Qur'an from Imam Abu Al-Hajjaj Yusuf ibn Abi Abbas Ahmad Al-Hasani. He also took from Shaykh Nasr Al-Zawawi, Shaykh Muhammad ibn Tumarat Al-Sanhaji, Shaykh Muhammad bin Ahmad Al-Maghili, also known as Al-Jallab. He also studied Usul-ul-Fiqh and Mantiq from Shaykh Muhammad ibn Al-Abbad Al-Tilmisani. He studied the Risala of Ibn Abi Zayd from Al-Hafidh Abu Hassan Ali bin Muhammad Al-Taluti. He also studied Al-Irshad by Imam Al-Juwayni in Aqida with Imam Abu Al-Qasim Al-Kinabshi. He also studied the transmitted sciences of Hadith from Imam Abu Zayd Abdul-Rahman Al-Tha'alibi, transmitting Sahih Bukhari and Muslim from him. He also studied from the great scholar Imam Abu Abdullah Ibn Marzuq.

Imam Al-Sanusi also took his tasawwuf from the great scholar and saint, Imam Ibrahim ibn Muhammad ibn Ali Al-Taazi. He was a scholar of all of the sciences, both the outward, such as Fiqh, Hadith, and Qur'an, as well as the inward sciences of the heart. He was also someone that the scholars, such as Ibn Marzuq (the grandfather) remarked that he was special even from the time that he was a child.

It is also noteworthy that Imam Al-Sanusi was either a direct classmate, or at the very minimum, shared all of his teachers with another highly influential, paradigm-shifting scholar, Imam Ibn Zikri Al-Tilmisani، another great scholar of Aqida and Usul. Imam Al-Sanusi was also the teacher of the great jurist and saint, Sidi Ahmed Zarruq.

His Works

Imam Al-Sanusi is known for his series of books referred to as Al-Sanusiyyat, in Aqida. The books vary in complexity, but all of them follow the same exact structure. The most complex of them is referred to as Al-Kubra and its commentary, which came to be known in many circles to be the final book in a student's general studies in Kalam. The Sanusiyyat is listed below, going in descending order of length:

• Al-Kubra and its commentary
• Al-Wusta and its commentary
• Al-Sughra and its commentary, also known as Umm Al-Barahin.
• Sughra Al-Sughra and its commentary
• Sughra Sughra Al-Sughra, also known as Al-Hafida

Al-Sanusiyyat came to be known as the core, fundamental curriculum for Aqida across the Muslim world. Hundreds of commentaries and marginal glosses have been written on the Sanusiyyat, especially on Al-Kubra and Al-Sughra, better known as Umm Al-Barahin. If one were to examine the popular teaching texts of Aqida that came after Imam Al-Sanusi such as Al-Murshid Al-Muin by Ibn Ashir, Jawharat Al-Tawhid by Imam Ibrahim Al-Laqqani, and Al-Kharida Al-Bahiyya by Imam Ahmed Dardir, they would find that structure, proofs, and even verbiage of these books are based on Imam Al-Sanusi's methodology. His books and its derivations such as the ones mentioned above were studied, commentated on, and taught in every corner of the Muslim world from West Africa all the way to Central Asia and the Pacific. Today, numerous translations and commentaries of the Sanusiyyat have been written in English, Malay, and many other languages as well.

Al-Muqaddimat

Imam Al-Sanusi wrote Al-Muqaddimat to be a companion to Umm Al-Barahin. Its length is similar to Umm Al-Barahin, and it covers many topics that are alluded to in Umm Al-Barahin but not directly referenced or explained in detail. Al-Muqaddimat (plural of Muqaddima, translated as introduction or preliminary) is structured into eight preliminaries that directly relate to the science of Aqida. Al-Muqaddimat namely deals with conceptualizations of the concepts of Aqida. Imam Al-Sanusi provides conceptualizations either through direct definitions or by giving divisions (taqsimaat) which is a method of definition by splitting something difficult to conceptualize into its requisite categories.

Since the books of Imam Al-Sanusi all build off of each other, Al-Muqaddimat is not only a companion book for Umm Al-Barahin, but also for Imam Al-Sanusi's entire paradigm and the paradigm of Kalam in general. The other books of Aqida that Imam Al-Sanusi namely deal with utilizing these terminologies to create propositions such as "The Universe is contingent." Al-Muqaddimat helps to bridge the gap to understand the meaning of these propositions by giving formal meanings to "contingency" and the likes. This book, along with Imam Al-Sanusi's compendium on logic was written to be the scholar's reliance for understanding the matters of Kalam. This is based on the formal definition of "matter" (mas'ala), which is defined as "the answer to a question in propositional form with proof." His book on logic was written to explain how to formulate valid proofs and recognize the format and structures of propositions. This book, Al-Muqaddimat was written to define different meanings pertinent to the questions of Kalam and to identify the types of propositions that relate to Aqida. Together, these two books form a foundation to build and understand the propositions of Kalam.

Translator's Key:

• (SM): Sharh Al-Muqaddimat by Imam Al-Sanusi. The author's own commentary on Al-Muqaddimat.
• (BN): Sharh Al-Bunnani on Al-Muqaddimat
• (SK): Sharh Al-Kubra by Imam Al-Sanusi
• (SW): Sharh Al-Wusta by Imam Al-Sanusi
• (SS): Sharh Al-Sughra (Umm Al-Barahin) by Imam Al-Sanusi

[The Purpose of This Preliminary]

(SM) The purpose of this preliminary is to establish a paradigm through which the rest of the Divine Law can be understood. This preliminary has ties to every science.

All knowledge of creations, secular and religious, can be divided into two categories: concepts and propositions made out of those concepts. For example, “human” is a concept. “Humans have bodies” is a proposition. A proposition and a judgement are synonyms. The reason a proposition is called a judgement is because you are judging the subject of the proposition by the predicate. You are judging, or affirming, “humans” to have bodies. Likewise, I can judge through negation, such as saying “the universe did not create itself”.

All of our knowledge is divided in this way. Out of these, Imam Al-Sanusi mentions three of the types of propositions that are used in the majority of discussions related to Aqida, Usul-ul-Fiqh, and Fiqh.

[The Difference Between Concepts and Propositions]

(SM) if a concept is understood without affirming something to it, then it is referred to as a tasawwur which is a simple conceptualization. When two concepts are understood together and a relationship of negation or affirmation is established, then this is a judgement. It is also referred to as a proposition.

(SM) Judgements fall under three categories or types.

1. Either, it is a judgement that is derived from the Divine Law such that it cannot be known otherwise. If that is the case, then it is a legal judgement, or a hukm shar'i.
2. If it does not fall under that category, then it is divided into two other categories. Either it can be known by the intellect alone without needing observation. In this case, it is a rational judgement.
3. If it cannot be known by the intellect alone, meaning that it requires observation to observe, then it is referred to as an empirical judgement.

[What is an Address (Khitab)?]

(SM) An address (Khitab) here is defined as speech intended for those who are capable of understanding. In this case, the Address refers to the Eternal Speech of Allah, the Exalted. This is to distinguish the Address of Allah from other speech, since others' speech would not be considered a legal judgement.

There are additional restrictions that apply, since the Speech of Allah may pertain matters other than what is considered a legal judgement. For example, a verse in the Qur'an that pertains to the attributes of Allah would not be considered a legal judgement according to the scholars of Usul ul-Fiqh, the study of the juristic principles of the Shari'ah. Likewise, there are verses that are related to non-living objects, such as "On that day, We shall move away the mountains" (Al-Kahf 47) that would not be considered a legal judgement.

[Is an address and speech the same?]

(SM) It was differed whether an address (Khitab) and speech refer to the same matter, since the definition of khitab is speech which is intended for someone who is capable of understanding. Based on this, it was debated whether the existence of the one being addressed is a pre-condition for a Khitab.

The preponderant opinion of the Ash'ari school is that a Khitab does not require the existence of the one being addressed. Shaykh Abdul Qadir Al-Fasi (d. 1091 AH) writes in his compendium, Khulasat Al-Fasi:

"Pre-Eternal Speech is called the Address. Commands are related to the non-existent in a relationship of potentiality." "والكلام في الأزل يسمى خطابا. ويتعلق الأمر بالمعدوم تعلقا صلاحيا"

[The Indications of the Address of Allah]

(SM & ibid.) While the Khitab is the Speech of Allah, which is His Eternal Attribute, the Speech is indicated by the Qur'an, Sunnah, and scholarly consensus (Ijma'a) since these are infallible indications of the Speech of Allah. The first two are clear, while the third, Ijma'a, is known to be infallible based on the mass-transmitted affirmation of the Prophet ﷺ.

[Does the Address Pertain to Children Before Puberty?]

It is known with certainty through the various sources of the Divine Law that legal accountability only occurs for those past puberty. In light of this, scholars of Usul discussed certain circumstances based on reports of the Prophet ﷺ where it would seem that the Divine Law pertains to children as well. The following discussion explains the various ways that scholars reconciled how those reports could be reconciled with the other, more certain principles

(SM) Legally accountable: Refers to the individual past puberty who has a sound mind. From this, it is known that the judgements do not relate to the pre-pubescent. This is according to one opinion. This is related to the question in Usul, "The command [of the Lawgiver] to command [someone else to do] something: is the [Lawgiver's] command for that thing, or not?" This is in reference to the Prophet's ﷺ command to command one's children to pray before they reach puberty. So is the Prophet's ﷺ command to the parents to command their children to pray the same thing as him ﷺ commanding the children to pray?

If one says says no, it is not the same thing, then the Address is intended towards the parents and they are responsible for it, not to the youth.

If one says yes, it is the same thing, then the Address does in fact relate to the actions of children in matters like this.

Since we already agree (as mentioned in the next section) that recommendations are also considered legal judgements for the one who is legally accountable despite them not being punished for leaving off that recommended action neither in this life, nor in the hereafter, then it is sensible for youth to also be commanded by the Address since it is established that they will be punished in this life for leaving the prayer, as the Prophet ﷺ commands in the Hadith.

(SM) Requests of the Divine Law are of four types, depending on the firmness of the request and whether it is a request to do or to leave something. These four, plus the permission to do something are referred to as the five rulings of the Divine Law for legally accountable. In other words, requests are divided into either:

a) Commands

b) Prohibitions

Each of these can be further divided. Is the request firm, or is it not firm? Based on this, we have four categories.

1. Commands that are firm.
2. Commands that are not firm.
3. Prohibitions that are firm.
4. Prohibitions that are not firm.

(SM) This is based on the classification of the Usulis except the Shafi'is. They see the legal judgements to be five: the aforementioned four, and then permissibility. Imam Al-Subki added a sixth category, called "sub-optimality". If there is a prohibition that is not firm, but it was a direct indication from the Address, such as recitation of Qur'an in the Ruku'. However, if the non-firm prohibition was based on an indirect entailing indication (dalala iltizam) then it is sub-optimal. For example, it is recommended to perform tahajjud at night. Thus, leaving this action off and sleeping all night would be considered sub-optimal since it is the opposite of the recommended action. However, the disliking was not direct since there was no direct proof that indicated such. Imam Al-Subki based his categorization on Imam Al-Juwayni's work.

Recommendations and obligations are both requests for an action, but recommendations are optional. The reader may recognize that there are more than two words used to refer to obligations and recommendations. For example, fard and wajib are often referred to refer to obligatory matters while mandub, sunnah, mustahab, fadeela, and other terms are used to refer to recommended matters.

Are these terms synonymous, or do they have different meanings? The answer depends on the context of the discipline. For example, if one were to go to a book of Usul, one would find that they are used interchangeable. For example, in his Khulasat ul-Faasi, Imam Abdul-Qadir Al-Faasi says, “Fard and Waajib have the same meaning. Mandub (meritorious), Sunnah, Nafila (supererogatory), Mustahab (liked), Tatawu’ (voluntary), Muraghab fihi (encouraged), and Hasan (good) are all synonyms.” This is in the context of Usul-ul-Fiqh, which approaches the Sacred Law through a foundational approach of placing the categories of legal judgements into broad categories.

However, in terms of fiqh, these terms carry different meanings. The specific definitions of these will depend on the madhab. For example, the Hanafi school will separate fard and wajib based on epistemological differences which will lead to obligations falling under two subcategories. In the Maliki school, terminologies such as Sunnah, mandub, and fadila all refer to a recommendation, however, they indicate the strength of the recommendation.

Likewise, obligations can also refer to two meanings. The first meaning is the one that Imam Al-Sanusi mentions, which is the meaning discussed in Usul ul-Fiqh. There is an additional meaning that the scholars of Fiqh use in their terminology: “an action upon which the validity of another action relies”, even if that action is not obligatory. (See Al-Mawahib Al-Jalil by Imam Muhammad Al-Hattab).

(SM) Stipulations are established to act as indications for rulings related to the actions of the legally accountable. Some of those stipulations may be voluntary, such as stealing being a voluntary stipulation that a legally accountable person brings upon themselves to make the ruling of cutting off of the hands obligatory upon them. Sometimes, they are involuntary and out of the control of the legally accountable such as the sun indicating the obligation of prayers. However, it is to be noted that the legal judgements of the Divine Law are not dependent upon these stipulations. Rather, these stipulations are placed by Allah to be indications towards the ruling.

(SM) There are three types of stipulations.

1. Either the Divine Law set both the existence and absence of something to be an indication for a ruling: this is a cause.
2. Or, the Divine Law set only the absence of something to be an indication for a ruling but not its existence: this is a pre-condition.
3. Or, the Divine Law set only the existence of something to be an indication for a ruling but not its absence: this is a preclusion.

(SM) the existence of the cause necessitates the existence of a judgement such as the existence of the sun moving past the zenith necessitating the existence of the judgement of obligation for the Dhuhr prayer.

(SM) The statement refers to two situations. 1) The absence of the pre-condition necessitates the absence of the validity of a particular action: for example, the absence of purification necessitating the absence of the validity of one who prays in that state. 2) The absence of the pre-condition necessitates the absence of the ruling of a particular action. For example, the absence of the pre-condition of a year of wealth above the nisab threshold for Zakat passing by necessitates the absence of the ruling of the obligation of Zakat for that wealth, since it did not fulfill the condition of a year going by.

(SM) "by the means of repetition": this particular condition is what separates empirical judgements from rational judgements. If a judgement exists that does not require repetition to affirm, then it is not an empirical judgement. For example, a legal judgement only requires a single verse in the Qur'an to be revealed in order to make something obligatory. Similarly, an intellectual judgement also does not require repetition in order to be established.

(SM) "With the validity of reversal": this refers to the fact that empirical judgements are affirming a relationship between two matters, but there is no affirmation of the first matter being a necessary cause for the second matter. Rather, at any time, there is a possibility that the first matter can occur without the second also occurring. Or, the second matter can occur without the first matter happening.

(SM) The reason why this distinction is important is due to the conflation of rational judgements with empirical judgements among many people. Many believe that empirical judgements, i.e all of our observations about the natural world, are due to a relationship of necessity, which is an unfounded assumption. Based on this conflation, many deny the possibility of resurrection, miracles, and other matters.

(SM) Although this judgement is referred to as a rational judgement, the other judgements are also comprehended by the intellect as well. However, this type of judgement is singled out because the intellect and nothing external is needed to formulate this type of judgement.

(SM) "without dependence on repetition": this differentiates this judgement from an empiric judgement. While a rational judgement like "a part is smaller than its whole" is comprehended merely by comprehension of its parts, a statement such as "consumption of citrus cures scurvy" requires observation of a repeated relationship between the two concepts.

(Al-Nibras) Imam Al-Taftazani explains that the intellect is one out of the three sources of certainty: the five senses free from obstruction, a trustworthy report, and a sound intellect. He defines the intellect as an ability of the soul that prepares it for knowledge and perceptions.

(SM) These three categories are all-inclusive with no fourth category. This is based on the following rational division:

1. Either it accepts both affirmation and negation.
2. Or, it accepts only affirmation.
3. Or, it accepts only negation.

The first is possibility, the second is necessity, and the third is impossibility.

(SM) This type of necessary judgement is also known as an intrinsic necessity. However, there is a second type of necessity known as a contingent necessity. A contingent necessity is something that independently may simply be a possibility, but due to an external factor- namely, the transmission of the Knowledge of Allah through the Qur’an and Sunnah- it becomes a necessity. This is because once it is established through rational proofs that it is impossible for the Messenger ﷺ to convey falsehood, then everything that he related must necessarily be true as well. The work done to prove how the Messenger ﷺ is necessarily truthful is done in works such as Umm Al-Barahin by Imam Al-Sanusi and many other authors.

(SM) Similar to the abovementioned category, there is also another category of impossibilities called contingent impossibilities, such as the impossibility for Abu Lahab to enter paradise.

Possibilities are also referred to as contingents. Every created thing is possible, as its presence and absence can both be conceptualized by the mind.

(SM) meaning that they group all actions- both involuntary ones such as breathing or the pumping of blood, and voluntary ones- to all be of the same nature and animals have no free will at all.

(SM) The Qadariyyah believe that the free will that exists within animals is created by Allah to be independent within the creation. Their claim is that once Allah, Exalted is He, places free will inside of the animal, then He has no control and thus no knowledge of what the animal will choose to do with that free will. Their claim necessitates that He is simply the first-mover in charge of the action of things that have no free-will such as the colors and movements of inanimate objects like trees and rocks, while animals create their own actions with their own free will.

(SM) Directly, meaning the actions that a creature would do to itself, such as the waving of its hands.

(SM) Transitively, meaning the actions that occur as a result of a creature’s direct actions, such as a mug being knocked over by someone waving their hands.

(SM) The connection of temporal ability with action simply means that there is a rationally possible, empirically observable relationship between one’s ability and their action. For example, one’s ability to get out of bed, when combined with the intention of getting out of bed, results in the person getting out of bed. However, the true Doer is only Allah, the Exalted, and He is the One who caused the person to get out of bed. However, the action of Allah, the Exalted, was accompanied with His creation of the person’s ability to get out of bed.

(SW) That ability to get out of bed had no effect whatsoever in the actual end result. It can be likened to a parent giving their child a toy steering wheel while driving a car. When the child turns the steering wheel left, the parent turns the car left as well. The child’s turning of the steering wheel had no bearing on the car actually turning left, but the child’s motion was accompanied by the parent who was, in fact, the one controlling the vehicle the entire time.

(SB) The difference between Ahlul Sunnah and the Qadariyya is the way in which they characterize the connections of the temporal ability. For the Qadariyya, the temporal ability has multiple connections: it has the connection of Kasb, or acquisition, which is the very thing that causes moral responsibility. Sunnis are in agreement with this. However, the Qadariyya go a step forward and say that the temporal ability also connects with actions by creating them from nothing (ikhtira'). On the other hand, Sunnis say that the spontaneous creation of our actions is not connected to our temporal ability. Rather, it is connected to Allah's Eternal Power. The Qadariyya's position is clear heresy due to the position necessitating multiple actors who have power that competes with Allah's Eternal Power, among many other clear rational contradictions.

(SB) The Imam starts with this category because it strongly resembles the school of the Qadariyya. Both pure Zoroastrianism and the Qadariyya are founded in the idea of independent entities that do not have control over each other. Zoroastrians believe in a dualistic theology of a god of light and a god of darkness, each in conflict with the other. Similarly, the Qadariyya believe that Allah is the source of all goodness, and human beings create their own actions of evil out of nothingness. Although the purpose of their belief is to distance Allah from evilness, it leads to far greater contradictions where they are forced to affirm inability to Allah. The simple answer to their flawed belief is that there is a difference between Allah's Will (Irada), and what He is pleased with (Rida). There is no necessity that Allah creates something and that He is pleased with it.

The Trinity is a well-known, unsolvable rational contradiction that Christian theologians have struggled to answer. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Philosophy and Christian Theology starts by saying:

Many Christian doctrines raise difficult philosophical questions. For example, Christians have traditionally insisted that they worship a single God, while simultaneously identifying that God with a trinity comprised of three numerically distinct, fully divine persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. It is not easy to see how three divine persons add up to one God. Similarly, Christians have also asserted that a human man, Jesus of Nazareth, is also God-the-Son, the second person of the divine trinity. It is not easy to see how a human man, who is born, lives, and dies, could also be a fully divine being.

Both of these creeds- firstly that God is composed of three: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirt, and secondly that Jesus is simultaneously a man while also being God-the-Son and the second person of the trinity- have glaring contradictions. May Allah protect us from such blasphemy and deceit. Imam Al-Sanusi addresses them in his commentaries.

(SM, SB, & SK) The trinity: they believe that God is composed of three parts, referred to as the Persons (in Arabic: Uqnum, derived from Greek) of the Trinity, a phenomenon called hypostasis. They state that their God is three persons: the first is the person of existence, referred to as the Father. The second is the person of knowledge, referred to as either the Son or the Word. The third is the person of life, referred to as the Holy Spirit. They simultaneously affirm that these are three separate persons, while also being one god. So, while all three are separately gods, when they come together they are also one god as well. The impossibility of one being three and three being one does not require any further explanation.

(SM, SB, & SK) The second belief that the Christians hold is that God is simultaneously composed of three attributes or states- which somehow become an essence- while also having what is referred to as a hypostatic union (ittihad) with the human body of Jesus. They maintain that it is the Word, i.e the person of knowledge that forms the Trinity which becomes unified with the physical body of Jesus, and in doing so, becomes the "second Person of the Trinity". On one hand, if they affirm that the trinity is composed of three attributes, then it is unintelligible that these attributes can simultaneously reside in the body of Jesus while also being the Trinity at the same time. If the trinity is composed of three essences and one of them, the Word, resided in Jesus, then their polytheism is clear as they divided God into three. May Allah protect us from falsehood.

Imam Al-Sanusi also quotes from Imam Al-Razi about a debate that he had with a group of Christians, quoted below.

Imam Al-Razi wrote:

“I debated with some priests, finding them to be extremely simple-minded. I taught them a single principle of the intellect so that I can debate them using it.

It was that the existence of an effect necessitates a source, but the absence of an effect does not necessitate the absence of the source. For example, the origin of the universe. It is the effect of our Lord, the Most High. The existence of the universe necessitates the existence of the source, which is He, the Exalted. But, the absence of the effect, i.e. the origin of the universe, would not necessitate the absence of the source, i.e our Lord, the Exalted. Our Lord existed regardless of whether time existed or not.

This principle was hard for them to grasp, but I stayed with them until they understood it and accepted it.

After that, I said to them: why do you specify that the hypostasis of intellect subsists in the human form of Jesus alone? [i.e. why do you give Prophet Isa the eternal attribute of knowledge that we believe is only the attribute of Allah].

They replied: We specify the union [of an Eternal Attribute with a created body] to him because of what miraculously manifested at his hand of bringing the dead back to life, which can only happen from a God.

I replied: Your statement necessitates the godhood of Moses, peace be upon him! Based on what manifested at his hand, like his staff coming to life as the giant serpent or the splitting of the seas into great cliffs, etc, these are actions that we know with certainty cannot be done by a creation!

They tried to reject that, but I replied to them: You already accepted the principle that the existence of an effect necessitates the existence of a source. Based on your [false] claim, the proof that you gave to Jesus being a God is also present in Moses as well! This necessitates that he is a God like Jesus too because it is impossible for the existence of an effect to occur without the existence of the source.

Then I asked them: Is it possible that us and other lowly animals are also gods?

They said: No, of course not! There exists no proof (i.e no miracles) that they or we are gods!

I said to them: How can you say that when you already accepted that the absence of an effect (i.e absence of miracles) does not necessitate the absence of the source? Based on your beliefs, maybe those animals are also gods but the proof just hasn’t manifested itself yet! “And so the disbeliever was dumbstruck. And Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people.” (Surah Baqarah, 258)

(SM) Here, a reason (‘illa) refers to a cause tied to an effect in such a way that they cannot be separated. So, whenever the cause exists, the effect will necessarily exist too. Nature (tabi’a) refers to a cause that is tied to an effect, but with reasons, pre-conditions, and preclusions such as what was mentioned in the first preliminary. When a cause is said to be natural (tabi’i) it means that the effect will necessarily exist as long as the reasons and pre-conditions are present and the preclusions are absent.

(SW) Both of these are said to be patently impossible because each of these logically necessitate that the ‘illa or tabi’a must be pre-eternal as well. If these were pre-eternal, it would necessitate that the universe is pre-eternal, as well, which is logically impossible as evident by the fact that the universe is contingent.

(SM) The belief that the actions of Allah are governed by what our human intellect deems as moral (tahsin wa taqbih) is the basis upon which groups such as the Brahmins denied the existence of Prophets. If the function of Allah sending the Prophets is to teach people right from wrong, then there is no need for Prophets since the intellect itself can come to the conclusion of what is right and wrong. This idea is patently false as it assumes that Allah needs to act, i.e., is dependent on created things, in order to accomplish His motives. This would transition the judgement that the universe is possible, to the judgement that the universe is necessary (so that it fulfills the motives that supposedly govern Allah, Exalted is He). This transition is a logical impossibility.

This belief is also found in varying degrees in the Mu’tazila in their belief that tahsin wa taqbih are rational, or their belief that Allah is rationally obligated to do what is best for His creation.

In the following passage, Ibn Juzay al-Kalbi outlines the position of the Ash'ari school on the matter, which is often misunderstood by interlocutors and even some Ash'aris:

They ["good and evil"] are used in three (separate) usages:

1. The first: good refers to what is in accordance to one's desire or predisposition, and bad refers to what contradicts it.
2. The second: good is what is an attribute of completion, and bad is what is an attribute of imperfection. There is no difference of opinion that good and bad with these two usages does not depend on the revelation of the Divine Law.
3. The third: good is what Allah has praised, and bad is what Allah censures and punishes. This [category] is where the difference of opinion occurs.

Al-Ash'ari says: it is not known and not established except by the Divine Law.

The Mu'tazila said: rather the intellect necessitates its certainty even before the Prophets, blessings and peace of Allah be upon them. It does not depend on the Divine Law to identify it, except for the fact that they made three categories for it:

1. A category that the intellect knows self-evidently, such as the goodness of telling the truth for one who will benefit, and the badness of lying for the one who will be harmed.
2. A category that the intellect knows through reflection, such as the goodness of telling the truth for someone who will be harmed, and [badness] of lying for the one who will benefit.
3. A category that the intellect cannot arrive to, such as the obligation of fasting the last day of Ramadan and the prohibition of fasting on the first day of Shawwal. In the first two, the Divine Law came to emphasize what the intellect already knew about them. For the third, the Divine Law came to clarify what could not have been reached, while also acknowledging that the goodness of all of them was established even before the Divine Law.

According to Al-Ash'ari, the Divine Law is the what caused the good or bad [of the action] to come into existence for all of the categories. So, there was no judgement before the revelation of the Divine Law.

(Read More)

(SM) A substrate (mahal) is defined as an entity along which attributes are established. In bodies, this may be a physical locus, or in the case of the attributes of Allah, the Exalted, who has no physical place, it is His Entity or Self (dhaat).

(SM) A cause (mukhassis) is defined as an agent that specifies a contingent creation to be a certain possibility and not another possibility. For example, a red sweater was specified to be red and not blue.

(SM) The nature of all contingent creations is that they have to be specified, i.e., be in one way and not the other. These are dichotomous contingencies because even if one were to exist, then it would affirm their opposite. For example, if one were to negate that an object exists, they would simultaneously be affirming its existence. Likewise, if they were to affirm that an object started to exist in 1990, they would be simultaneously be negating its existence in 1550. Every body and its accidents are attributed with these six contingencies.

The last two preliminaries deal with the positive attributes ascribed to Allah the Exalted and the Noble Prophets. These two preliminaries give technical definitions of the attributes that are necessary for Allah and the Prophets. These terms will be used in other books such as Umm Al-Barahin without necessarily defining them. For this reason, Imam Al-Sanusi lists them all here as a reference point for all of his other works where he mentions these terms.

(SK) Eternal (azali) is defined as whatever has no beginning. Its opposite would be something contingent or temporal, which has a beginning. (SM) Eternal Power refers to the Power of Allah, the Exalted, and is different than temporal ability which refers to the power of humans which has no effect. (See Preliminary 2).

(SU) “Clearly” (daruratan) here refers to how linguistically and rationally, we intrinsically know that there is a difference between Hearing, Seeing, and Knowing. While it is impossible for us to capture the meaning of Allah’s Eternal Hearing as it does not resemble our hearing, we intrinsically do know that His Hearing is different than His Seeing.

(SM) Ash’ari theologians differed whether Perception (idrak) is an attribute that is separate from the attribute of Knowledge or whether it carries an additional meaning. The latter expert theologians, such as Ibn Al-Tilmisani, Imam Al-Sanusi, and many others agreed that the best opinion is to suspend judgement and not take either side.

(SM) “expressed in different expressions” refers to the difference between the belief of Sunni Muslims and the falsehood of the beliefs of their opponents. On one side, the Hashawiyya asserted that the very words that we recite in the Qur’an, indeed the very pages and ink of the Qur’an are Eternal and have no beginning. Their heresy originated from ignorance of the rational judgements (See Preliminary 4, Category 7: Ignorance of Rational Judgements). On the other side, the Mu’tazila believed in the impossibility for Allah to have an attribute of Speech and believed that the Qur’an was simply a creation. Between both of them is the path of the truth, Ahl al-Sunnah, who believe that Allah, the Exalted, has an attribute of Speech that is free from the aforementioned qualities such as letters and sound. However, His Speech has expressions (kalam lafdhi) that are created, which is the Qur’an. However, these created expressions are not in a state of hypostasis or incarnation with the Eternal Speech (i.e something simultaneously being divine and created at the same time) since this is a logical and scriptural absurdity. Rather, the expressions are an indication to the Eternal Speech.

Division here relates to what the Eternal Speech pertains to, not to division of the Speech itself.

Imam Al-Sanusi transitions from the discussion on truth and falsehood to the discussion on Integrity. In the previous preliminary, he ended the discussion on truth and falsehood since truthfulness is an attribute that is necessary both for Allah, the Exalted, and the Noble Prophets.

Then, he moves on to define Integrity (Amaana), an attribute that is necessary for Prophets.