In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Beneficent. Peace and Blessings of Allah upon our Master, Muhammad, and his family and companions. The Shaykh, Jurist, Scholar, Abu Qasim ibn Ahmed ibn Juzay, may Allah have mercy on Him and make paradise his abode (ameen) says:

All praise is due to Allah, He who with knowledge raises the ranks of its people. He abundantly increases their reward upon its acquisition and transmission. The same way He rewards them with acceptance in its study and memorization.

Blessings and peace of Allah upon our Master Muhammad, the Seal of the Prophets and Messengers. He who guided all of creation to the way of truth and its pathways. He did the utmost in the conveyance of the Message through his words and actions. He took great pains in establishing the religion of Allah and clarifying its branches and foundation, so that it became apparent the basis of the King's, Exalted is His Glory, saying: "He is the One who sent His Messengers with guidance and the religion of truth to make it publicly manifest above all religions."

May Allah be pleased with the people of his house and his noble companions. May He gather us with them under the shade of His Throne on the Day when there is no shade except His shade.

To proceed:

[Unit 1: The Faculties of Knowledge]

Within it are ten chapters:

[Chapter 1: The Faculties of Knowledge]

It is of two types: conceptualizations and propositions.

As for conceptualizations, it is the comprehension of singular essences such as knowing the meaning of a “body”, “movement”, “animals”, “inanimate objects”, “temporality”, “eternality”, etc.

As for propositions, it is the ascription of one matter to an essence with negation or affirmation, like us saying “bodies are temporal” or “bodies are not eternal”. Conceptualizations are first, and affirmations come after that. Ascription of propositions come in five ways: certainty, ignorance, doubt, probable knowledge, and improbable knowledge.

Certainty: is complete conviction in agreement with the truth. It is also said that its definition is “knowledge of the thing to know as it is”, but it is disputed since it necessitates circular logic. It is said about it: knowledge is an attribute that leads to a differentiation that cannot be negated.

Ignorance: is complete conviction in disagreement [with the truth]. It said about this that it refers to compound ignorance.

Doubt: is the possibility of two or more matters without any preference.

Probable knowledge: is the stronger probability [between two conflicting matters].

Improbable knowledge: is the weaker probability [between two conflicting matters].

Supplement: The intellectual judgment of a matter over a matter is called a proposition (tasdiq). If he says it, then it is a declaration. If he wants to advance it as an argument, then it is called a claim. If he mentions it in the context of a proof, then it is called a proposition (qadiyya).

Chapter 2: What is used to reach conceptualizations

They are three things: definitions, descriptions, and synonyms.

As for definitions: they are the characterization of the essence of a thing by its genus and differentia.

As for descriptions: they are the characterization of the essence of a thing by its genus and its unique qualities.

Our saying “essence of a thing” is: asking about it through “what” in contrast to our asking about it through “which”, or “where”, or “when”, or “how”.

Our saying “its genus”: includes the highest genus, and what is under it is the category. So the category is a genus with respect to what is below it. However, what is optimal in definitions and descriptions is to mention the closest genus.

Our statement about the definition of a definition: "its differentia": it is a necessary, intrinsic attribute, without whose understanding, the thing cannot be understood. Such as mental rationality for humans.

Our statement on the definition of a description: "by its unique quality": a unique quality is a necessary attribute except that it is not intrinsic. Thus, the [thing's] understanding is not predicated on it. Such as "the ability to laugh" for humans. Our saying, "humans are rational animals" is a definition, and our saying "humans are laughing animals" is a description. We mention the the genus so that it is general in order for (definitions and descriptions) to be all-encompassing which is their purpose.

We preconditioned the differentia or unique quality to exclude what is not sought after [to be defined]. They are both attributes with which the thing being described is differentiated from other than it, thus the definition and description are excluding, which is to be reflexive. Sometimes, the genus is omitted from the definition or description, causing it to be incomplete. For example, our saying "human beings are rational or laughing."

As for synonyms, it would be like our saying "wheat" and we say: "[it is] durum". Its precondition is that it must be equal to it, not more general or more specific. In definitions, descriptions, and synonyms, avoided are characterizations with [words with] multiple meanings, more unknown, what is stated ambiguously, and circularity, which is a definition that is not defined except by knowing the definition of what is sought after, so it reaches a standstill.

[Note]: A definition is not the same thing that is being defined if what is intended is the statement. If what is intended is the meaning, then it is the same thing. So for everything in existence, there are four levels: its existence in reality, its example in the mind, its mention by the tongue, and its writing by the pen.

[Chapter 3: What is Used to Reach Propositions]

What is used to reach certainty is called a proof [dalil]. What is used to reach probable knowledge is called a sign [amara]. Then, proofs are divided into four categories:

Transmitted, rational, sensory, and the combination of rational and sensory.

As for transmitted: it is the proof of the Book, the Mass-Transmitted Sunnah, and scholarly consensus... nothing other than that. So anything other than that such as juristic analogy and its likes only provide probable knowledge.

As for rational, it is divided into two categories: self-evident and contemplative.

As for self-evident: it is what does not depend on contemplation or inference. It is also called intrinsic knowledge, such as man's knowledge of his own existence, and his knowledge that two is more than one, and his knowledge that anything created must have a creator, and other first principles.

Contemplative is its opposite: it is what requires contemplation and inference.

As for sensory: it is the apprehension by way of the five senses. They are: hearing, seeing, smelling, taste, and touch. Subjective experiences such as man's knowledge of his enjoyment and pain.

As for the combination between sensory and rational: it is mass-transmission, repetition, intuitive reasoning. Abu Al-Ma'ali and Abu Hamid also added the signs of states such as paleness for fear or redness for embarrassment. It is summarized from this that the providers of certainty are six. They are:

Transmission, self-evident rational knowledge, contemplative rational knowledge, the senses, subjective experiences, mass-transmission, repetition, intuitive reasoning, and the signs of states.

Then, below this level are what provide probable knowledge. They are three things:

As for common knowledge: it is what is agreed upon by the people, or most of them, or experts, about common matters or other than that. Sometimes the intellect judges to follow it, or it does not judge by it or does not contradict it.

As for accepted reports: they are what is transmitted by an upright narrator or narrators that do not reach the level of mass-transmission, but the mind trusts it.

As for illusory concepts, they are what one imagines to be rational, but in reality, they are not.

[Chapter Four: The Names of Utterances]

They are: polysemous, synonymous, qualitative, quantitative, and dissimilar. We will differentiate them with a division. It is that: an utterance and its meaning has four different types:

The first: that the utterance is one while the meanings are multiple. This is polysemy, such as "eye".

The second: that the utterances are multiple and the meaning is one. This is synonymy, such as wheat, durum, and triticum.

The third: that the utterance and meaning are both one. If the meaning is [always] the same in its contexts, such as "man", then it is qualitative. If its meanings are different or gradated, then it is quantitative, such as "light" referring to the light of the sun or the light of a lantern.

The fourth: that the utterances and meanings are both different. These are dissimilar words, such as "humans", "horses", and "birds". From this division, their definitions are understood.

[Two notes]: First: sometimes it is assumed that certain words are synonymous when they are actually dissimilar words. Like "sword", "blade", and "Indian sword". This is because a sword is just the name of the essence, while "blade" is in terms of cutting, and "Indian sword" is in terms from it originating from India. Likewise, our saying "Zayd's speech is eloquent." So the first is [the name] of the essence. The second is of an attribute. The third is of an attribute of an attribute.

The second: that a polysemous word is: an utterance that was stipulated for two meanings- coined, and did not transfer from one of them to the other. If it transferred from one of them to the other, then it is not called polysemous in [Usul and Mantiq's] terminology. Rather, if it transferred without any relationship, then it is called a "transferred word". If it was transferred due to a relationship, then it is named with respect to the first word being a "literal" and the second word being "figurative".

Chapter Five: Indications

They are of three kinds: complete, partial, and linked.

Complete indications: are the indication of a word to the complete thing it was named for, such as the indication of the word "house" to the entirety of it.

Partial indications: are indications of the word to a part of the thing it was named for, such as the indication of the word "house" to its roof.

Linked indications: are the indications of the word to what is linked to the thing it was named for, such as the indication of "roof" to walls.

[Three notes]: Fakhr Al-Din ibn Al-Khatib added an additional restriction about partial indications. He said that it is "... part of the thing it was named for, in and of itself being a part." to distinguish between complete indications for a meaning and partial indications for other than that. For example, our saying, "a letter" to one of the particles of meaning such as "if only" (layta) or "I wish" (la'alla), and the letter "laam" itself with the meaning of being a letter of the alphabet. So the first indicates towards the laam (in layta and la'alla) through partial indication and the second indicates it [the laam] with complete indication.

The second: it is preconditioned in linked indications that the linkage be in the mind and in the real world, or in the mind alone, but not in the real world alone.

The third: Shihab ul-Din Al-Qarafi divided indications into two categories:

Indication of utterances, which is what we already mentioned.

Indications by utterances: it is the speaker's usage of the utterance as a literal or as a figurative.

[Chapter Six: The Difference Between Particulars and Universals, Wholes and Parts, Universal Predicates and Partial Predicates.

As for universals: it is that thing whose meaning can be fathomed to be multiple, regardless of whether multiple actually exist such as humans, or one, such as the sun, or they do not actually exist at all. This consideration is from the perspective of the mind alone.

As for particulars: they are what indicate to a single thing itself, such as the names that label things. The grammarians call universals "indefinite" and they call particulars "definite".

Their types are five: pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, labels, what is made definite with an Alif and Laam at the beginning, and what is associated with a definite.

[Benefit]: Pronouns according to most of the people are particular, such as its specification that it is the first-person, second-person, or third-person. The grammarians say that it is the most definite definitive.

Shihab ul-Din says: it is universal in its coinage and is particular in its usage.

As for a whole: it is the collection as a group, such as the words for quantities.

A part: is what the whole is composed of, such as ten being composed by five twos.

As for universal predicates: they are what necessitate the judgement upon every instance from all the instances in reality, such as His saying: "All upon it [shall] perish." (Al-Rahman, 26)

Partial predicates: are what necessitate the judgement on some instances in reality, such as our saying: "some animals are humans".

It may be difficult to distinguish between "الكل" (the whole) and "الكلية" (the universal predicate). The judgment of a whole (الكل) is on the group as a whole, not on each individual separately. This is like saying "Every person lifts the huge rock." The judgment in universal predicates (الكلية) is on each individual separately, so that no individual is left out, as in saying "A loaf of bread satisfies every person."

[Chapter Seven: The Relationship Between Some Essences and Others]

When we look towards essences with others [essences], you find them to be in four categories:

The first: that one of them be absolutely more general than the other, and the other be absolutely more specific than the other, such as animals and humans. It is inferred [from this relationship] that the existence of the specific necessitates the existence of the general, and the absence of the general necessitates the absence of the specific. But the absence of the specific, nor the existence of the general cannot be proven.

The second: That each of them be more general than the other from one perspective and more specific from another perspective, such as "human" and "white". There is no proof from one of them upon another at all.

The third: that they are both equal, such as "human" and "able to laugh". It is inferred that the existence of any of them necessitates the existence of the other, and the absence of one necessitates the absence of the other.

The fourth: that they are apart, such as animals and inanimate objects.

Known things also have three categories:

Contradictories: These are two [meanings] that do not come together, nor are they both absent together, such as the existence of Zaid and his absence. Therefore, the existence of one implies the absence of the other, and its absence implies its [the other's] existence.

Contraries: are those that cannot both come together, but it is possible for both of them to be absent, such as black and white. It is inferred from the existence of one of the absence of the other. But the absence of one of them does not necessitate anything [about the other].

Contradistinctions: They are two [meanings] that can exist together or both be absent, such as "human" and "horse". One's existence does not indicate anything [about the other], nor does its absence.

[Rule for this chapter]: It is that when you start one of the meanings with "every", and you make the other one the predicate, then if it is true from both sides, then they are equivalents. Such as, "every human can laugh" and "every laugher is human".

If it is false from both sides, then they are apart, or are general and specific from different perspectives.

If it is true from one side, then one of them is absolutely more general and the other is absolutely more specific, such as our saying "every human is an animal." The [meaning] attached to the "every" is the specific, while the predicate is the general. If it were reversed, it would be false.

Chapter Eight: The Types of Rational Proofs

They are of three types: deduction, induction, and analogy.

As for deduction: it is defined as speech that is composed of two or more premises which begets a conclusion. It [the conclusion] is what is sought after, either its affirmation or negation.

This is deduction (Qiyas) in the terminology of the logicians. As for Qiyas in the terminology of the jurists, we shall mention it in its place.

Then, this logical deduction: if its premises are all definitive, and it is composed in the way that it is supposed to along with all of its preconditions, it is called a proof (Burhan).

If its premises, or one of its premises, are not definitive, or some discrepancy ends up in its composition, or there is a deficiency in its preconditions, then it does not provide certainty. It may provide probabilistic knowledge or lower than that.

As for induction: it is for a judgement to be looked at in a majority of real instances, and they are found to be in the same state. So it becomes highly probable that that particular state is in all of its real instances.

As for analogy: it is to judge one particular with the judgement of another. It is the weakest of them [the types].

The difference between them:

That deduction is an argument transferred from a universal meaning to a universal meaning below it or to a particular.

And induction is that it is transferred from numerous particulars to a universal.

And analogy is that it is transferred from a particular to a particular.

Chapter Nine: The Types of Logical Deduction

They are five: Proofs, Argumentation, Rhetoric, Provocation, and Sophistry.

As for Proofs (Burhan): it is valid, definitive deduction.

Valid: it is that its premises are definitive. All of them are intrinsic knowledge, correct contemplative knowledge, and sensory knowledge free from the mistakes of the senses.

As for Argumentation (Jadal): it is that its premises are either accepted or wide-spread among the masses. It is usually valid, but occasionally invalid.

The benefit of argumentation is that the interlocutor wins their debate.

As for Rhetoric (Khitaba): it is [an argument] whose premises are widely accepted. With it, strong probabilistic knowledge is reaching. The self is convinced by it and relies on it while also keeping in mind its contrary or the self accepting its contrary.

The benefit of rhetoric is that it inclines the listener towards what is wanted from him. It is strengthened by the eloquence of the language, the sweetness of the words, and the beauty of the tone.

As for Provocation (Shi'r): it is what includes a simile, analogy, metaphor, or the imagination of something in the self intended to encourage desire or fear, to motivate, to urge giving, or to provoke joy or sadness, to make distant things seem close, or the like. It affects the self despite knowledge of its falsehood, and its impact is encompassed by the beauty of voice and melody.

Clarifying these phrases in this [particular] terminology compared to their meaning in language and general terms:

As for proofs:

In language: they are anything that leads to veracity, regardless of whether it is speech or not.

In this terminology: speech arranged in a specific way with specific preconditions.

As for rhetoric, in language it is any speech of a speaker, regardless of whether it provides probable knowledge or certainty.

Here [in this terminology], it is specifically what provides probable knowledge.

As for provocation (shi'r): In this terminology, it is broader than general terminology, because here it is figurative speech, analogy, and the likes, that are not true, regardless of whether it is in prose or poetry.

In general terminology: it is the known, metered versification.

Chapter Ten: Proofs

We will talk about the parts that it is composed of and its forms.

As for its parts, in every proof and logical deduction, there must be two or more premises and a conclusion. Sometimes, one of the premises is omitted due to prior knowledge of it.

The premise is a nominal sentence called a proposition and it includes a subject (mawdu') and a predicate (mahmul). The logicians call the thing being informed about the subject and the information to be the predicate. The grammarians call it a subject (mubtada') and predicate (khabar). The jurists (Fuqaha) refer to it is a ruling and the subject to be the object of the ruling.

It is a condition that what this proposition necessitates, either negation or affirmation, is known or accepted by the interlocutor.

When this proposition is paired with another proposition like it, it produces between the two of them a conclusion. It is another nominal sentence that is also called a proposition. This is what is meant to be affirmed or negated, which is why the jurists say, "the perspective of the proof" and they mean by that the perspective of the necessity of the conclusion from its premises.

Propositions are also divided into two: affirmative, which are positive, and negative, which are disaffirmed.

Each of them is divided into four categories: complete universal, complete particular, individual, and unpointed.

Complete universals are those whose subject is generalized such as our saying: "Every intoxicant is prohibited."

Complete particulars are like our saying, "Some animals are human."

The word that completes them is called a siwar (enclosure) such as "all" or "some".

Individual propositions are: [propositions] whose subject is a particular, such as our saying "Zayd is standing."

Unpointed propositions are: [propositions] where it is [un]clear whether the judgement is universal or partial, such as saying "Indeed mankind is in loss." [Al-Asr, 2]

However, individual and unpointed propositions are discarded in the sciences, so only the two complete propositions- universals and particulars- remain. Each of them are either affirmative or negative, so propositions [in the sciences] are these four.

Then, proofs, in the way that they are composed, come in three forms:

The first type: Some people call this type a correlative syllogism. The logicians refer to it as "entailment", and linguists refer to it as a proof of basis.

It includes two premises. Every premise has a predicate and subject- which is the judgement and the object of the judgement. So there are four [different] things, except that one of them is repeated in both premises. Thus, there remain three things. The logicians refer to them as terms. They are: the middle term, the major term, and the minor term.

As for the middle term, the jurists refer to that as the basis. It is what is repeated in the two premises.

As for the major term: it is the judgement, and it will be the predicate in the result.

As for the minor term: it is the object of the judgement, and it will be the subject in the result.

The premise that contains the minor term is referred to as the minor premise.

The premise that contains the major term is referred to as the major premise.

An example of this is our saying: "Every intoxicant is prohibited. All beer are intoxicants. So, all beer is prohibited."

Our saying: "Every intoxicant" is an affirmative universal. It is the major premise.

Our saying: "All beer are intoxicants" is the other premise. It is also an affirmative universal. It is the minor premise.

Our saying, "beer is prohibited" is the result.

The middle term is "intoxication" because it is repeated in the two premises.

The minor term is "beer" because it is the subject in the result and is the object of the judgement.

The major term is "prohibited" because it is the predicate in the result, and it is the judgement itself.

Then, this type has three figures:

The first figure: the middle premise is the subject of one of the premises, and the predicate of the other one.

If you express it using the terminology of the jurists, you would say that the basis (illa) is the judgement in one of the presises, and the object of the judgement in the other one.

This is like the example we just mentioned. Do you not see that "intoxication" -which is the basis- occurred as the object of judgement in our statement "every intoxicant is prohibited" and occurred as the judgement in our statement "beer is an intoxicant"?

It is a condition in this example, that the minor premise be affirmative, not negative, and that the major premise be universal, not particular. Then (and only then), will it produce a valid result.

The second figure: the middle premise is the predicate of both of the premises. The jurists refer to this as a "difference."

It is a precondition in order for it to produce results, that the major premise is universal, and that one premise differs from the other in terms of its affirmation or negation.

An example of it is our saying, "all clothing is measured by length", and "no item of usury is measured by length". Therefore, "no clothing is an item of usury."

The third figure: that the middle premise be the subject of both premises. The jurists refer to this as "contradistinction".

It is a precondition in order for it to produce results that the minor premise is affirmative and that one of them is universal.

Its example is our saying, "all wheat is edible," and "all wheat is an item of usury." So, "some edible things are items of usury."

Three notes:

The first: whenever the proof contains a premise that is either negative, particular, or probable knowledge, then the result will be the same. This is because it will always follow the inferior premises, and it will never follow the superior ones.

The second: The three figures share in the fact that they will never produce a result if both premises are both negative or both particular.

The third: The result of the second figure will not be anything except negative, and the result of the third figure will not be anything except particular. As for the result of the first figure, it can be affirmative or negative, universal or particular.

Summary: In the composition of every figure, there are sixteen conceivable scenarios. This is because every premise can be of four times, and four times four is sixteen. However, in the first figure, there are only four viable scenarios that produce results, and in the second there are four, and in the third there are six. The rest of the scenarios do not produce viable results due to the lack of the preconditions needed to produce them.

The second type: the conjunctive conditional. The jurists refer to it as a linkage (talazum). It is composed of two premises.

The first of them is composed of two propositions. They are attached to each other with a particle of conditionality. The other proposition is called the response of the condition, and the conclusion. Sometimes the antecedent is referred to as the exigency, and the conclusion as the requisite.

The second premise [is composed] from a single proposition that is accompanied by a particle of exception according to the nomenclature of the logicians, such as "however". Or, it is not accompanied by that, and the statement itself carries that meaning.

This second premise includes the mention of one of the previous two premises, intact, either by negation, or by affirmation. This results in the [affirmation of the other] premise, or its exact opposite.

An example of this: "If the Witr prayer can be completed by the one riding an animal, then it is an optional (Nafl) prayer. It is known that it can be completed by the one riding an animal. Therefore, it is an optional prayer.

This type has two categories:

• The first of them: that the consequent be more general than the antecedent. Then, it will produce results from two perspectives:

1. The first one: that the exception is the antecedent itself, such as our saying: "if the prayer was valid, then the one praying was in a state of purity."
2. The other: That the exception be the exact opposite of the consequent, such as our saying... "but, he is not in a state of purity. Therefore, the prayer is not valid."

An exception that is the exact opposite of the antecedent, or is the consequent itself, will not produce a result.

The second category: that they be equivalent. Then, it will produce results from four perspectives, like our saying: "if the sun has risen, then daytime is present."

That is because when there are two equivalents, then the affirmation of either of them will necessitate the affirmation of the other. And the negation of either of them will necessitate the negation of the other. This is in contrast to a relationship of one being more general than the other. The negation of the specific does not necessitate the negation of the general, nor does [affirmation of the general] necessitate the affirmation of the specific. That is why there are two (previously mentioned) perspectives that invalidate the production of a result.

The third type: the disjunctive conditional

The theologians refer to this as "dissection" and "division". Some jurists refer to it as "categorization of opposites". It is composed of two or more premises. The first is accompanied by a particle of correlative conjunction, and the second is with a particle of exception or something that takes its meaning.

Its example: our saying, "this quantity is either even or odd. However, it is even. Therefore, it is not odd." It produces results from four ways:

• An example of the first: what we previously mentioned.
• An example of the second: "However, it is odd, so it is not even."
• An example of the third: "However, it is not even, so it is odd."
• An example of the fourth: "However, it is not odd, so it is even."

That is because they are two things (even and odd) that are exact opposites of each other. So, the affirmation of any of them results in the negation of the other, and the negation of any of them results in the affirmation of the other. So, there are four ways.

It is not a precondition that it is limited to two types. Sometimes, it can be three or more. However, it is a condition that they are all equal, such as our saying "the quantity is either equal, less, or more [than another]." Its example in Fiqh is "Either something is obligatory, recommended, prohibited, disliked, or permitted." The affirmation of any of the categories necessitates the negation of all the rest.

Completion:

When a proof cannot be established on a proposition, it can be inferred by affirming the invalidity of its exact opposite. Or, its invalidity can be established by affirming its exact opposite.

Two propositions that are exact opposites are ones where if one is true, then the other is false, and vice versa. It is a precondition that the object of the judgement in the two propositions is one (the same), and the judgement is one (the same). In that case, the judgement will be true in one of the two opposites.

[Unit 2: Legal Judgements in Usul]

It has ten chapters:

[Chapter One: Types of Judgements]

They are five: obligatory, recommended, prohibited, disliked, and permitted.

• Obligatory: what is requested to do with a binding request.
• Recommended: what is requested to do with a non-binding request.
• Prohibited: what is requested to refrain from with a binding request.
• Disliked: what is requested to refrain from with a non-binding request.
• Permitted: what the Divine Law does not request to do, nor to refrain from doing.

These definitions are more valid than defining them in terms of punishment and reward, such as their saying that "the obligatory is that which is rewarded for doing and punished for refraining from" due to two perspectives:

The first: Neither reward, nor punishment, are intrinsic attributes of the legal judgements. They are only the consequence of them, so it is not valid to use them to define the judgements.

The second: Punishment can sometimes be erased if Allah forgives them, and reward can sometimes be erased if the intention is not present. This is used similarly in rebuttal of those who say that "the obligatory is that whose abandoner is blamed, and the prohibited is that whose doer is blamed."

[Chapter Two: Names of these Judgements and Their Levels]

As for the obligatory, it is [referred to as]: fard (mandatory), mafrud (mandated), maktub (ordained), mahtum (decreed), mustahiq (owed).

The Hanafis say: the fard is what's obligation is proven by a proof that is certain, and the wajib is that what's obligation is proven through juristic reasoning (ijtihad).

The fard is divided into two: individual obligations- which are obligatory on every legally accountable individual, such as prayer and fasting, and communal obligations- which if some of the people establish it, then it is excused for other than them, such as the funeral prayer, seeking knowledge, and jihad. If the collective concertedly abandons it, they are sinful.

As for recommended: it is optional. It has different levels, the highest of which is Sunnah. Below it is the mustahab (liked) and it is [also referred to as] a fadila (meritorious act). Below that is the nafila (superogatory). Sometimes the nafila is used to refer to any time of recommendation.

Recommendations: are either on individuals, which are stressed: such as witr and fajr (the two units before the Subh prayer), and the two Eid prayers. And sometimes, it is on the collective, such as the Adhan and Iqama, and the recommended actions done on the deceased.

The prohibited: it is the haram (unlawful), mamnu' (forbidden), mahdhur, ma'siyya (disobedience), sayyi'a (wrongdoing), and ithm (sin).

It is on two levels: minor sins and major sins. Sometimes, they are referred to as makruh (disliked).

As for the disliked: sometimes its disliking is so harsh that it borders the prohibited, and sometimes it is light.

As for the permitted (mubah): it is the halal (lawful) or ja'iz (allowed). Sometimes it is expressed by [saying] "no harm" or "no issue" or "no sin" or "no problem".

Chapter Three: Optioned and Broadly-Timed Obligations

Obligations, in terms of their timing, are divided into two: narrowly-timed, and broadly-timed.

The broadly timed: it is when the time of the action is more than it (the action itself). Sometimes, it is delineated such as the prayer times, and sometimes it is not delineated. Instead, it encompasses one's entire lifetime, such as Hajj.

The obligation pertains to the entire time, according to the majority of the Malikis. and some said it is a non-specified portion of the time that the legally accountable

It is attributed to the Shafi'is the rejection of broadly-timed obligations, because they say that the obligation pertains to the beginning of its time.

It is attributed to the Hanafis its rejection [as well], because they say that the obligation pertains to the end of its time.

As for the optioned obligation, it is like the expiation of an oath. He selects between feeding, clothing, or freeing a slave. The obligation pertains to one of them without specification, and the legally accountable individual specifies it by his action.

The Mu'tazila said: all three are obligatory. It is a difference in expression.

The sequential obligation: it is one where the second matter is not permissible when there is ability to do the first one, such as freeing a slave, then fasting, then feeding in the expiation of a dhihar divorce.

[Chapter Four: The Preconditions of Legal Accountability]

They are: intellect, puberty, presence of mind, the absence of coercion, Islam, and the conveyance of the Message.

Intellect: separates someone from inanimate objects, beasts, the insane, and the asleep.

Puberty: separates someone from adolescence. One cannot disagree with this by bringing up the obligation of Zakat on the wealth of a child and the paying of damages of what he wastes [from the Zakat], because his guardian is the one tasked with this.

Presence of mind: separates someone from one who forgets.

It is differed: is the absence of coercion counted as one of the preconditions of legal accountability or not? The more apparent opinion in the Maliki school is that it is indeed a precondition.

There is no difference in opinion that the disbelievers are tasked with belief. It is differed whether they are tasked with the branches of the Divine Law during the time of their disbelief or not?

A group says: they are tasked when the Message of the Messenger, peace and blessings be upon him, reaches them.

Another group says: they are not tasked with the branches until they accept Islam, along with consensus that they (the branches) are not accepted from them, nor are they valid, until they believe.

Fakhr Al-Din ibn Al-Khatib said: the result of this difference goes back towards the compounding of punishment in the hellfire.

[Chapter Five: Attributes of the Acts of Worship]

They are six. Two of them are dichotomous: punctuality and make-up. Two more are dichotomous: validity and invalidity. Two more are dichotomous: dispensations and strict orders.

As for punctuality: it is the execution of the act of worship within the time appointed to it by the Divine Law.

As for make-up: it is its execution after the time appointed to it by the Divine Law.

It is differed: is the obligation of the make-up the original command, or is it a new command?

The acts of worship are of three types:

1. What is attributed with both punctuality and make-up, such as the five prayers.
2. What is not attributed with that, such as the supererogatory prayers.
3. What is attributed with only punctuality.

As for validity: according to the theologians, it is what is in accordance to the command. According to the jurists, it is what lifts [the obligation of] make-up. So the prayer of the one who has probable belief that they were in a state of purity, but was actually impure, would be valid according to the theologians, and invalid according to the jurists.

The difference is only in the naming, not in the judgement.

Validity is more general than acceptance (ijzaa') because acceptance is not attributed to anything accept an obligation.

Invalidity is the exact opposite of validity. It occurs in the acts of worship, as well as contracts like commerce and marriage. It is more general that voiding (butlan) because voiding is only attributed to the acts of worship.

It is said that they are synonyms, and it necessitates repeating the action for obligations, and the lack of execution of the purpose of the contract.

As for dispensations: it is a forbidden act becoming permissible, or the [permissibility of] refraining from an obligation, due to a reason necessitating it. Sometimes the obligation ceases to exist such as someone starving eating carrion, and sometimes it does not cease, such as the traveler breaking their fast.

Strict orders: what is incumbent on slaves [of Allah] to do or refrain from.

[Chapter Six: Good and Bad]

They are used in three (separate) usages:

• The first: good refers to what is in accordance to one's desire or predisposition, and bad refers to what contradicts it.

The second: good is what is an attribute of completion, and bad is what is an attribute of imperfection.

There is no difference of opinion that good and bad with these two usages does not depend on the revelation of the Divine Law.

The third: good is what Allah has praised, and bad is what Allah censures and punishes. This [category] is where the difference of opinion occurs.

Al-Ash'ari says: it is not known and not established except by the Divine Law.

The Mu'tazila said: rather the intellect necessitates its certainty even before the Prophets, blessings and peace of Allah be upon them. It does not depend on the Divine Law to identify it, except for the fact that they made three categories for it:

• A category that the intellect knows self-evidently, such as the goodness of telling the truth for one who will benefit, and the badness of lying for the one who will be harmed.

• A category that the intellect knows through reflection, such as the goodness of telling the truth for someone who will be harmed, and [badness] of lying for the one who will benefit.

• A category that the intellect cannot arrive to, such as the obligation of fasting the last day of Ramadan and the prohibition of fasting on the first day of Shawwal.

In the first two, the Divine Law came to emphasize what the intellect already knew about them. For the third, the Divine Law came to clarify what could not have been reached, while also acknowledging that the goodness of all of them was established even before the Divine Law.

According to Al-Ash'ari, the Divine Law is the what caused the good or bad [of the action] to come into existence for all of the categories. So, there was no judgement before the revelation of the Divine Law.

Al-Abhari said: Things were all prohibited before the Divine Law, and Abu Al-Farj said they were permissible, and people other than them reserved judgement.

[Chapter Seven: What Legal Judgements Are Predicated On]

They are three: the existence of the cause, the existence of the precondition(s), and the absence of the preclusion(s).

As for causes: is that whose existence necessitates the existence of a judgement, and whose absence intrinsically necessitates its absence, such as the entrance of the month of Ramadan being a cause for the obligation of fasting.

As for the precondition: it is that whose absence necessitates the absence of the judgement, but its existence does not intrinsically necessitate the existence or absence of the judgement, such as health and residency for the obligation of fasting. Sometimes, a person can be healthy and a resident, but it is not obligatory on him to fast outside of Ramadan.

As for the preclusion: it is that whose existence necessitates the absence of the judgement, but its absence does not intrinsically necessitate the absence or existence of the ruling, such as menstruation for fasting.

What is taken into consideration for preclusions is their existence, for preconditions is their absence, and for the cause is its existence and absence.

We said "intrinsically" in each of them to differentiate it from what is necessitated from an external reason, due to the judgement being predicated on all (three) of them.

[Completion]

The aforementioned precondition is a legal precondition. Preconditions have four categories:

1. Legal, such as purity for prayer.
2. Rational, such as life for knowledge.
3. Empirical, such as nourishment for life in some animals.
4. Linguistic: its articles are: "if" and what it takes its place, "if only" , and "when". "If" (إن) is specific to something uncertain (to occur), and "when" (إذا) precedes something uncertain and certain (to occur), and "if only" (لو) only precedes [events in] the past tense, in contrast to the other two.

Shihab Ul-Din Al-Qarafi said: "linguistic preconditions are really causes (asbaab) because their existence necessitates existence and their absence necessitates absence."

[Chapter Eight: Categories of Rights]

They are three:

• The right of Allah alone, such as belief and prayer.
• The right of other slaves [of Allah] alone, which are only excused when the slave excuses them, such as debt.
• A category where it is differed whether the right of Allah is more prime, or the right of the slave is more prime, such as the punishment for false accusation.

[Chapter Nine: Means]

The origin of judgements is two categories: ends and means.

• Ends are where it is sought out for its own sake.
• Means are what connect one to the end. Its ruling is the same ruling as the ruling of the end when it (the end) cannot be reached except by it (the means). So the means to an obligation are obligatory, such as walking for Jum'ah prayer. A means to a prohibition is prohibited, and likewise for all the other judgements.

When the ends ceases to be taken into consideration, then so does the consideration of the means.

[Free Disposal of Objects by Legal Agents]

They are ten types:

1. The first: the generation of ownership of something previously unowned, such as hunting and reviving barren land.
2. The second: the transfer of ownership from one responsibility to another. Sometimes, it is through exchange such as commerce, renting, lending, and other than exchange, such as gifting, charity, endowment, and the spoils of war.

3. The third: dropping of rights: sometimes it occurs with exchange, such as the khula' divorce, forgiving a crime by financial reparations, or without exchange, such as forgiving for the sake of Allah and freeing slaves.
4. The fourth: possession: sometimes it occurs with the permission of the Lawgiver, such as lost property, or it occurs with permission of someone other than Him such as the possession of a commodity with the permission of the seller, or the possession of a collateral, and other than that.
5. The fifth: reserving, and it is giving. Sometimes it occurs with an action, such as reserving an article of clothing for its buyer, or with just an intention such as the father taking [from the wealth of his child] and his intent to give it back to his child.

6. The sixth: assuming responsibility: such as oaths or guarantees.
7. The seventh: merging: which is business in all of its different types.
8. The eighth: specification for public use, such as land endowments.

9. The Ninth: Permission: either it is in objects, like hosting guests, or in usage such as borrowing.

10. The Tenth: Destruction: either it is for bodily benefit, such as eating food, or slaughtering animals, or for prevention of harm, such as killing harmful animals, or it is for the right of Allah, the Exalted, such as killing the disbelievers, breaking the cross and the tools of idle amusement.

11. The Eleventh: Punishment: Either it is fixed, like the hudud punishments, or it is discretionary such as the ta'zir punishment.

[Unit Four of Knowledge of Usul: Evidences of Judgments]

[Chapter One: Enumeration of the Evidences]

In short, it is of four types: a text, the transmission of a methodology, and inference.

• Text: is the Book and the Sunnah.

• Transmission of a methodology: is scholarly consensus and the opinions of the Companions.

• Inference: is analogical reasoning and what resembles it.

It is obligatory on the scholar to first look for the matter in the Book. If he does not find it, he looks for it in the Sunnah. If he does not find it, then he looks towards what the scholars reached consensus in or differed upon. He goes by the consensus and stays within the opinions in matters of difference. If he does not find it in their opinions, then he infers its judgment based on analogical reasoning and other things from the different evidences.

Their number in total is twenty, between what is agreed-upon and what is differed upon. They are: The Book, the Sunnah, the Law of those before us, consensus of the nation, consensus of the people of Madinah, consensus of the people of Kufa, consensus of the ten of the Companions, consensus of the four Caliphs, the opinion of a Companion, analogical reasoning and legal reasoning, presumption of continuity, default innocence, taking the easier in the easier, induction, juristic discretion, customs, public benefit, cutting off means [to harm], and infallibility [in juristic reasoning].

Chapter Two: The Noble Book

It is the main evidence, and the strongest of them. We mean by it, the Great Qur'an, written between the covers of the mushaf (copy), transmitted to us through mass-transmission by the famous recitations.

Our saying: "written between the covers of the mushaf" is because that is what was agreed-upon by the companions and those after them, and whatever is other than that is not Qur'an.

Our saying: "transmitted through mass-transmission" is to exclude verses that are not in the mushaf whose transmission was solitary. They are not considered evidences according to Malik, because they were not transmitted like the mass-transmission of the Qur'an. They are considered evidences like solitary reports according to Abu Hanifa.

Our saying: "by the famous recitations", meaning the seven recitations and their likes or what nears them in popularity and validity of transmission, like the recension of Ya'qub and Ibn Muhaysin. With this, we exclude the anomalous recitations.

It is not permitted to recite a letter except with three conditions:

1. It conforms to the writing of the mushaf.
2. It is narrated through a valid, widespread narration.
3. It conforms to the speech of the Arabs, even if it is in some dialects or perspectives.

Sometimes, there are words in the Qur'an that are not from the language, such as mishkat or istabraq.

There also occurs literal and figurative speech in it, in accordance with the way that the Arabs spoke.

Chapter Three: The Sunnah

It is of three types: The statement of the Prophet, blessings and peace be upon him, his actions, and his tacit approval.

As for his statements, blessings and peace be upon him, they are considered proofs like how the Qur'an is used as a proof, because he, blessings and peace be upon him, did not speak out of whim. And, because of His saying, "Obey Allah and the Messenger..." [Aal-Imran, 32]. There occurs in it what occurs in the Qur'an regarding linguistic discussions, because they take place in all speech.

As for his actions, blessings and peace be upon him, they are divided into two: acts of obedience, and normal affairs.

If it was a normal affair, like eating, clothing, standing, or sitting, then it is a proof of its permissibility. Following him, blessings and peace be upon him, in its manners and attributes is praiseworthy.

If it was an act of obedience, then there are three perspectives:

1. That he does it to clarify something else. Then, its ruling takes the ruling of the object of clarification. If he is clarifying an obligation, then it is obligatory. If he is clarifying a recommendation, then it is recommended.
2. That he does something to obey a command. Then, its ruling is the ruling of that command: obligatory or recommended.
3. That he does it for the first time without a cause. It is differed whether it is an obligation or recommended.

Branches:

The first: When a ruling is confirmed for him, blessings and peace be upon him, it is confirmed for his nation as well, unless there is a proof that indicates it is distinct for him.

The second: In his actions, blessings and peace be upon him, there occurs every type of clarification: clarification of ambiguity, specifying the general, interpretation of the apparent, and abrogation.

The third: When his statement, blessings and peace upon him, contradicted his action, it is differed: does the statement take precedence or the action? The stronger opinion is that his statements are preponderant because it [a statement] indicates by its formulation. This is when the history is not known. If it is known, then the later one abrogates the previous one.

As for his tacit approval, blessings and peace be upon him, it is that he heard something and did not reject it, or he saw an action and did not reject it, with the absence of any hindrances. That indicates to its permissibility.

As for what was done in his era and he did not reject it, if it was something that would be habitually impossible for it to be unknown to him, then it is like his tacit approval. If it is possible that it was unknown to him, then it is not an evidence.

Appendix:

This section is related to the law of those before us from the Prophets, peace be upon them. It is differed whether it is legislative for us or not. There are three opinions:

1. That the laws of all of them is legislative for us.
2. That the laws of all of them are not legislative for us.
3. A distinction between Ibrahim, al-Khalil, peace be upon him, and others. His law is legislative for us, in contrast to the others.

These opinions are only for matters where their ruling is not confirmed in our law. As for what is confirmed in our law, then it [its ruling] is whatever it was confirmed to be, regardless of whether it conforms to the law of those before us, or not.

Chapter Four: Reports

It is speech that has the potential to be believed or disbelieved.

This expression is more optimal than the one who said "[to contain] truth or falsehood" because the report of Allah and His Prophet, blessings and peace be upon him, does not have any potential except truthfulness, and the report of a liar, like Musaylima does not have any potential except falsehood.

The benefit of this chapter is understanding the transmission of the Sunnah, and it has three sections:

Section One: Mass Transmission

The transmission of a report is of two types: mass-transmission and solitary transmission.

As for mass transmission, it is a report that a group transmits, for whom it would be nomically impossible for them to conspire on a falsehood. Fakhr ul-Din ibn Al-Khatib said, "their [the group's] number is without a limit, in contrast to those who confined it to twelve, forty, seventy, three-hundred, and other than that. Four is not among them according to the majority, despite Ibn Hazm saying that the transmission of two upright witnesses necessitates certainty.

Mass transmission provides certainty with two preconditions:

1. Both of its ends [of the chain] and its middle are equal in the number of its transmitters.
2. It is based on a matter that came to be known through the senses, in contrast to probable knowledge or knowledge acquired through reflection.

Note:

Certainty may occur in reports through ways other than mass-transmission. They are: the content being self-evidently or inferentially known to be certain, the report of the Messenger ﷺ, or a report which has consensus of the nation, or the signs of states, according to Abu Al-Ma'ali [Al-Juwayni] and Abu Hamid [Al-Ghazali].

Section Two: Solitary Reports

As for solitary transmissions, they are the reports of an individual or a group that does not reach the definition of mass-transmission. It does not provide certainty, and it only provides probable knowledge. It is a proof according to Malik and others, with preconditions. Among them are:

• That the narrator had differentiation during the time of hearing it, whether he reached puberty or not.
• That during narration, he had intellect, passed puberty, was Muslim, and upright. Uprightness is abstaining from the major sins, avoiding minor sins, and abstaining from matters that diminish one's honor.

The companions were all upright. Uprightness is affirmed either through examination or attestation. It is differed whether a single individual suffices in praise or criticism.

The narration of an open sinner or unknown state is accepted, and they differed upon accepting the narration of a heretic.

Among them [the preconditions] is that the narrator be a jurist, which Malik conditioned in contrast to the others.

And among them is that the falsehood of the testimony is not affirmed by something contradictory known through mass transmission, self-evident knowledge, or apodictic evidence, or that its nature be mass-transmitted, yet it is not mass-transmitted.

The narration is not to be degraded by laxity of the narrator in something other than the report, nor by his ignorance of Arabic, nor by people disagreeing with his narration, nor by a school of thought being opposite to his narration.

[Section Three: Examining the Modes of Narration and the Words of the Narrator]

As for the modes of narration, there are six. The highest of them is audition of the Shaykh. Then is reading upon him. Then is hearing someone read upon him, then is handing over [the book], then is oral authorization, then written authorization.

As for the words, if they are a Companion, then their words are of six levels:

The first: that they say, "I heard the Messenger of Allah, blessings and peace be upon him, say..." or "He told me..." or "He informed me..." or "He said to me..." This is an explicit statement that he learned this directly from the Messenger of Allah, blessings and peace be upon him.

Or, "He informed..." or "He told..." The apparent is that this was directly learned from him, blessings and peace be upon him, and is presumed to be this, but is not explicit.

Similar to that is "The Messenger of Allah, blessings and peace be upon him, commanded this..." or "....prohibited this..." Is this presumed to be that he heard it from him or not? [There is a difference of opinion].

The fourth: That he say, "We were commanded to do such-and-such or he forbade us from such and such..." This is open to a second possibility, which is: did the Prophet, blessings and peace be upon him, command this, or someone other than him? Unless, it was said by Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq, because it is known that he was not commanded by anyone other than the Messenger of Allah, blessings and peace be upon him.

The fifth: that he says, "we used to do such-and-such..." which opens the possibility: was this during the time of the Prophet, blessings and peace be upon him, or not?

When someone other than a Companion says, "The Messenger of Allah, blessings and peace be upon, said..." then this is a mursal (incomplete) Hadith. It is a proof according to Malik and Abu Hanifa, in contrast to Al-Shafi'i.

It is differed: is a Hadith to be narrated by its meaning? It is conditioned by those who permit it that he does not add to the meaning, nor does he subtract, nor is it more elusive [in wording].

As for the words of other than the Companions, they are on four levels:

The first is: "He told me..." or "He informed me..." or "I heard him say..."

The second: that it is said to him, "did you hear this?" and he replies yes.

The third: that it is said to him, "did you hear this?" and he responds with his fingers or head.

The fourth: that it is read upon him, and he does not reject it or interject by indication or other than that.

[Chapter Five: Abrogation]

It involves the Book and the Sunnah, not other than them. For this reason, we mentioned it after them. It has three sections:

[Section One: Its Definition]

Its linguistic meaning: removal, such as their saying, "the sun removed [did naskh] of the shadow," and transmission, such as "the book was transcribed."

Its legal definition is: an address indicating to the lifting of a ruling established by a previous address, along with it being later than it.

The difference between it and specification is from three ways:

• The first is that abrogation occurs after the establishment of a ruling, in contrast to specification.

• The second: that abrogation occurs after the abrogated [ruling]. Specification is sometimes delayed, and sometimes connected [to the ruling].

• The third: abrogation is invalidation of the entirety [of the ruling] and specification is exclusion of some [parts of it].

[Section Two: Its Judgment]

Abrogation is rationally possible and a reality known scripturally. The Jews, may Allah curse them, denied it, holding that it necessitates Him having imperfect knowledge, and the proof of its invalidity is from three perspectives:

• The first: what is agreed upon by all nations that the marriage of siblings other than twins during the time of Prophet Adam (peace be upon him) [was permitted], then was forbidden for all other nations.

• The second: that the Jews concede that their law abrogated what was before that, so if that is possible, then it is possible for something after it to abrogate it.

• The third: the difference between abrogation and imperfect knowledge is that it [imperfect knowledge] is that something that was previously unclear to Him becomes clear to Him, and abrogation is not that. It is only like the limiting of the duration of a ruling, such as a master commanding his slave to do an action. When it reaches the amount that the master wants, he ceases it and commands him to another order.

It is not possible for abrogation to occur except with three conditions:

• The first: that it is in rulings, not beliefs, nor in reports, except when they requisite a ruling.

• The second: that it occurs in the Book or the Sunnah, because scholarly consensus and analogical reasoning do not abrogate either of them and are not abrogated.

• The third: that the abrogating [ruling] is later and the abrogated is earlier. This is known through an explicit statement specifying its delay, or knowing both of their timings, or by the narration of one who died before the narration of the other ruling.

Abrogation is known by an explicit statement about lifting [the ruling], or the establishment of its contradiction or opposite, or the consensus of the nation on the abrogation.

[Section Three: The Abrogating and Abrogated]

• As for the Qur'an, it is abrogated by the Qur'an. Its abrogation by the mass-transmitted Sunnah is differed upon, and it is not abrogated by solitary reports, in contrast to Qadi Abu Al-Walid [Al-Baji] and some of the Dhahiris.

• As for the mass-transmitted Sunnah, it is abrogated by the Qur'an or the mass-transmitted Sunnah, not by the solitary report.

• As for solitary reports, they are abrogated by the Qur'an, the mass-transmitted Sunnah, or solitary reports.

It is possible for the abrogation of the more difficult by the easier, or vice versa, abrogation by an equivalent, abrogation to other than a replacement.

What is abrogated by the Qur'an is of three types:

• Abrogated in recitation and ruling.
• Abrogation in recitation, but not ruling.
• Abrogation in ruling, but not recitation.

[Chapter Six: Consensus]

It has two sections:

[Section One: Consensus of the Nation]

It is consensus of the scholars on a legal ruling. It is an evidence according to the majority of the nation, in contrast to the Khawarij and the Rawafidh [Shi'aa]. THe consensus of every era is an evidence, without the condition of the Ummah [agreeing] until the Day of Judgment due to the lack of any benefit to that consensus. It is not a condition for the entire generation to go extinct, in contrast to some people['s opinion].

Dawud Al-Dhahiri held that the consensus of other than the Companions is not an evidence.

The consensus of the laity is not taken into consideration, in contrast to Qadi Abu Bakr [Al-Baqilani].

What is considered in every field is the consensus of its experts, even if they are not experts in other than it.

Among them, no one is considered except the unrestricted expert [mujtahid], not imitators.

[Branches]

• The first: it is possible for agreement to occur after difference in a single era or a second era.

• The second: when the people of a first era differ on two opinions, it is not permitted for those after them to come up with a third opinion, in contrast to the Dhahiris.

• The third: when some of the nation gives a judgment and the rest are silent, then it is an evidence and a consensus. It is named a "tacit consensus" [ijma' sukuti]. It is said that it is an evidence but not consensus.

• The fourth: it is permitted according to Malik for consensus to form for a proof [dalil], sign [amara], and analogy [qiyas].

• The fifth: when consensus is conveyed through a solitary report, it is said that it is a proof, and it is said it is not.

[Section Two: Other Types of Consensus]

As for the consensus of the People of Madinah, it is a proof according to Malik and his companions, and it is prioritized over reports according to them, in contrast to the rest of the scholars. It is from one of the factors of preponderance according to all.

• As for the consensus of the People of Kufa, a group said it is [an evidence] due to the number of Companions who moved there. A group held the same about the People of Nearness ['itra], and the consensus of the four Caliphs due to their virtue.

• As for the opinion of a Companion that did not have any opposition: if it was well-known among the Companions, then it is an evidence like tacit consensus. If it was not well-known, it is an evidence according to Malik, and Al-Shafi'i's opinion differed upon it.

• As for when the Companions differed on two opinions, then they are two conflicting evidences. One of them is given precedence by its number [of followers] or by the agreement of one of the Four Caliphs with it. If they are equal, going back to another evidence is obligatory.

[Chapter Six: Juristic Reasoning]

It is the culmination* of reasoning and the domain of unrestricted expert reasoning [ijtihad]. Most rulings are established through it because the texts of the Book and the Sunnah are confined and the subjects of consensus are limited. However, reality is not confined, so the scholars are compelled to affirm them [the rulings] through analogy when they are not affirmed textually or through consensus.

Analogy is an evidence according to the scholars from the Companions and those after them except the Dhahiris. We shall discuss its definition, subjects, preconditions, types, and explanations.

[Section One: Its Definition and Subjects]

• Its definition is the correlation of a matter to another matter in the affirmation or negation of a judgment for them due to a matter that is shared between them.

By saying "known", we mean both known with certainty and probably. It also includes what exists and what does not exists. More succinct than that is that we say that analogy is the affirmation of the ruling of something explicitly stated to something unsaid, due to a common factor between them. The "explicitly stated" is the foundation of the analogy, which is the source [al-asl], and what is unsaid is the result of the analogy, and it is the branch [al-far'].

• As for its subjects, it includes legal rulings, which is our purpose, and in rational and linguistic judgment. It does not include [legal] impetuses [sabab] as saying that the sun rising causes the obligation of prayer just like its setting. It also includes amounts such as expiations, in contrast to Abu Hanifa.

It is not permitted to draw analogies based on dispensations [rukhsa] in contrast to Al-Shafi'i.

[Section Two: Its Preconditions]

There are eight. Some are conditions for the source and [some for] the branch.

• The first: that the ruling of the source is a legal judgment.

• The second: that it is established with a legal evidence.

• The third: that it is still established, not abrogated.

• That it is agreed upon by all scholars or between the two interlocutors.

• The fifth: that the source is not a branch of another source. This is differed upon.

• The sixth: that the source is not excluded from the realm of analogy such as acts of worship like the number of units of prayer or the amounts for punishments, and the likes, and the rulings that the Prophet, blessings and peace be upon him, is distinct in.

• The seventh: that the unifying attribute exists in the branch in the same way that it does in the source.

• The eighth: That there is no text about [the ruling of] the branch, because analogy is not taken into consideration in the presence of textual evidence.

[Section Three: Its Types]

We shall explain them by three categorizations:

The first categorization: analogy is divided into two types- analogy in basis and analogy in resemblance.

Analogy in basis: is where the common factor between the source and the branch being the attribute that is the basis [illa] for the ruling and what necessitates it, such as the prohibition of intoxicating liquor by analogy of wine. The common factor between them is intoxication which is the basis of the prohibition.

Analogy in resemblance: is where the common factor between them is an attribute that is not the basis of the ruling, such as the obligation of an intention in wudu' by analogy of tayammum. The common factor between them is that both of them are purification from ritual impurity, but purification from ritual impurity is not the basis for the obligation of the intention. It is merely an attribute shared by the source and the branch.

Those who hold analogy [to be valid] all agree that analogy in basis is a legal proof. They disagree on analogy in resemblance being an evidence due to its weakness and it can be turned. The Hanafis say that an intention is not obligatory in wudu' by analogy of removing filth [which does not require an intention] and the common factor between them is that both of them are purification through water.

Some Usulis added a third category, calling it analogy in indication. Abu Al-Ma'ali [Al-Juwayni] held that it is not counted as a standalone category, because sometimes it is affixed to analogy by basis and sometimes to analogy by resemblance.

Some added analogy in conformity, which is based on securing a benefit or removing a harm. We shall discuss it in the section about public benefit.

The second categorization: it is categorized from another perspective into two types: clear analogy and elusive analogy. It is by looking at that from various levels:

• The first level: affirming the explicitly stated ruling for the unstated, because it is a fortiori, such as the prohibition of hitting [one's parents] from His saying, "Do not say uff to them." [Al-Isra, 23].

The second level: affirming the ruling of the explicitly stated to the unsaid, because it is equivalent to it, like the saying of the Prophet, blessings and peace be upon him, "None of you should urinate in stagnant water and then wash himself from it." Defecating in the water is given the ruling of urinating in it due to it being equivalent in tainting the water.

It is differed upon whether the first two levels should be called analogy or not, due to their obviousness to the point that affixing the unsaid situation to the explicitly stated one is known with certainty, and does not require any thought or extrapolation of a basis [illa] and no one would disagree in it except someone obstinate or ignorant.

• The third level: analogy in basis. It varies in its clearness and elusiveness. Do you not see that the analogy of rice to wheat in its prohibition of in-kind usury [riba tafadul] is on the basis of its being a staple and storable good according to Malik and edibility according to Al-Shafi'i is not the same in its clarity as the analogy of liquor to wine on the basis of intoxication.

• The fourth level: analogy in conformity. It also varies.

The fifth level: analogy in resemblance, and it also varies.

The third categorization: the basis in analogy in basis is known by matters where some are strong than others. Due to this, the levels of analogy vary:

• The first: an explicit statement about the basis, like the Prophet, blessings and peace be upon him, saying: "[The obligation] of asking for permission was made only due to sight."

• The second, indications with the fa ["so"] particle, such as His saying, "The male and female thief- so cut off their hands." [Al-Maida, 38]. Or, with the ba ["because"] particle, such as His saying, "because they contradicted Allah and His Messenger" [Al-Anfal, 13], or with a lam ["to"] particle, like His saying, "We did not create Jinn and Man except to worship." [Al-Dhariyat, 56]. And inna [indeed], such as He, the Exalted, saying, "Indeed they did not believe in Allah, the Almighty." [Al-Haaqa, 33].

• The third: predicating a ruling on an attribute, such as his saying, peace be upon him, "the murderer does not inherit," meaning, due to his murder.

• The fourth: consensus on a basis.

• The fifth: constancy of the ruling with the attribute: it is its existence accompanied by its existence and its absence accompanied by its absence, such as stoning and being married.

• The sixth: inquiry and division, which is when it is said, "either the basis is X or Y, and it is invalid for it to be X" so its requisite is identified.

• The seventh: examination of the basis, which is to identify the basis among multiple mentioned attributes, such as what occured in the Hadith, "that a bedouin came and beat his chest and tore his hair, saying, 'I am destroyed! I am destroyed! I had intercourse with my wife during Ramadan!'" This is a group of attributes, but it is identified that his orders to expiate are only due to intercourse in Ramadan, not due to any other attribute mentioned."

[Completion]

The jurists use [the phrases] "examination of the basis", "extraction of the basis", and "clarification of the basis".

• As for examination of the basis [tanqih al-manat], we just clarified it. Manat means the basis.

• As for extraction of the basis, it is to identify the basis from unmentioned attributes, such as his saying, blessings and peace be upon him, "do not sell wheat for wheat except in equal amounts." So we examine, is the basis for this due to edibility, being a staple good, being something measured in volume, weight, or other than that?

• As for clarification of the basis, it is that the identification of the basis is agreed upon and it is sought to be established in the subject of debate.

[Section Four: The Nullifiers of Analogy]

They are ten, and by them, the interlocutor negates the analogy of his opponent during debate:

• The first: the analogy contradicting the explicit statement of the Qur'an or Sunnah. If contradicts a general statement of the Qur'an or Sunnah, then it is not invalidated by that, since general statements can be specified by analogy, with some difference of opinion about this. It is said that clear analogy can specify, not elusive analogy.

• The second: contradicting consensus.

• The third: the lack of confirmation of the unifying attribute.

• The basis failing to apply (qusur ul-illa), which is it [the basis] not extending beyond the source to other things.

• The fifth: nullification (naqd), which is the existence of the attribute in something without the ruling.

Nullification exists in all the other proofs by the occurrence of the proof in the absence of the proof's conclusion.

Nullification in definitions is the occurrence of the definition in the absence of the object of the definition.

It is an invalidator for definitions, and it is differed whether it invalidates proofs and bases.

• The sixth: is the opposite, which is the occurrence of the ruling without the attribute.

It only invalidates [the claim] when the interlocutors both agree that there is only one basis [illa]. When the ruling is present in the absence of it [the basis], it indicates that it is not to be considered.

As for when they both agree that the ruling has two or more bases, it does not invalidate, due to the possibility that one...