In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Especially Merciful.

Peace and blessings upon our Master Muhammad and his kin and companions.

The Shaykh Abu Muhammad Sayyidi Abdul Qadir bin Ali bin Yousef Al-Faasi, may Allah have mercy on him and be pleased with him, says:

All Praise is due to Allah.

“Usul ul Fiqh”: is knowledge of the general evidences used in Fiqh, the ways they are utilized, and the description of the one who utilizes them.

“Fiqh”: is knowledge of the rulings of the Divine Law that concern actions that are acquired from the Divine Law’s specific evidences.

“Rulings”: are the Address of Allah related to actions of legally responsible individuals. The Address is divided into two categories:

Address of legal responsibility: its preconditions are knowledge of the legally responsible individual and his ability to act.

Address of stipulation and notification, such as the Address that declares what is an impetus, a precondition, and a preclusion.

As for "validity" or "invalidity", it is said that the correct opinion is that they are both rational judgements.

The Address of legal responsibility is:

1. Obligation,
2. Prohibition,
3. Encouragement,
4. Permissibility,
5. Discouragement,
6. And Sub-optimality.

Then, if a ruling is changed to something easier due to an excuse while the impetus occurs for the original ruling, then it is called a dispensation (rukhsa). Otherwise, it is a strict order (azeema).

Pre-Eternal Speech is called the Address.

Commands are related to the non-existent in a relationship of potentiality.

“Fard” and “Waajib” have the same meaning (Obligation).

Meritorious, Sunnah, Supererogatory, Liked, Voluntary, Encouraged, and Good are all synonyms.

“Adaa’” (Punctuality) is the execution of what was ordered in its apportioned time.

“Qada’” (Make-up): is the execution of what was ordered previously، irregardless [of its circumstance] after its time.

Waqt (Time): is the time that the Divine Law has measured for something in absolute terms.

I’ada (Repetition): is execution of something a second time within its time.

Is I’ada done due to an unexcused deficiency or an excused one? There are two opinions.

Waqt: Either it is equivalent to the action, like Ramadan.

It is a narrowly-timed obligation.

Or, it exceeds the action, like the prayers. Prayer is a broadly-timed obligation. Sometimes, the Waqt ranges a lifetime, such as Hajj.

If a requested action is for a specific individual, then it is an individual request (‘Ayn). Otherwise it is a communal request (Kifaya).

The mandatory: is either following, or it is the main objective.

Sometimes it is related to one definitive matter, and sometimes it is left indefinite from a set of definite matters such as the ways of expiating a broken fast.

The obligation of something necessitates the impermissibility of its opposite.

It is [rationally] possible for one to be given legal responsibility to fulfill any type of impossible task.

It is not necessary when one is given legal responsibility for the precondition to have occurred, which entails legal responsibility of the disbeliever for the branches of the Divine Law.

There is no legal responsibility except with actions.

Legal responsibility is valid even with knowledge of the occurrence of the absence of a precondition.

Legal responsibility is made known before its Waqt enters even if the existence of the responsibility’s preconditions are not known yet.

The Foundations of Divine Legislation are:

1. The Book.
2. The Sunnah.
3. Scholarly Consensus (Ijma’).
4. Analogy.
5. Formation of Legal Reasoning.

The Book

It is the Qur’an.

The interpreter of it requires knowledge of its language and its various sub-categories.

It (language) is defined as coined utterances indicating towards meanings, transmitted through either mass testimony or individual reports، drawn from original sources.

Linguistic Coining (Al-Wad’): is assigning an utterance to signify a meaning it carries inherently.

An utterance (Lafdh): is an assigned meaning in it of itself.

The Coiner of language is Allah the Exalted. He made His slaves aware of it through either inspiration, creation of voices, or instinctive knowledge.

Utterances are:

1. Singular.
2. Composite.

Singular utterances are:

1. Articles.
2. Verbs.
3. Nouns.

Nouns are:

1. Universal.
2. Particulars.

Universals are:

1. Qualitative.
2. Quantitative.
3. Categorical.
4. Properties.

Particulars are:

1. Labels.
2. Other than that.

Labels are:

1. Categorical.
2. Specific.

If utterances and meanings are:

1. Both multiple then they are different words.
2. If they are the same then they are the same word.
3. If only the utterance is different then they are synonyms.
4. If only the meaning, then:

a. It is polysemy if it was coined for all of them. b. Otherwise, they are literal or figurative.

Literals are either:

1. Linguistic
2. Religious
3. Colloquial

The thing signified by an utterance is: 1. A meaning. 2. Or an utterance: singular or compound: a. [That is] meaningful. b. Or meaningless.

Used utterances are: 1. Speech 2. Other than that.

Speech:

• If it is made to request a meaning, then it is an interrogative.

• Or to request the occurrence or the stopping of something, then it is a command or a prohibition even if it is coming from an equal.

• Otherwise, it is a warning or an expressive utterance if it does not provide truth or falsehood.

• Otherwise, it is a declaration.

The thing signified by an utterance is also:

1. Explicitly stated.
2. Implicit.

Explicit is:

1. Distinct
2. Or not.

Distinct is:

1. A complete correlation if it points towards the entirety of the meaning.
2. A partial correlation if it points towards part of the meaning that it was coined for.

What is not distinct is:

1. Either it was intended that the truthfulness or validity be predicated on something omitted then it is an indication of exigence.
2. Or, it was not intended but the utterance necessitates what it was coined for then it is an indication of suggestion, i.e a requisite.

The scholars of logic [only] consider requisite indications that are rational and clear.

Implications are:

1. Corresponding.

2. Conflicting.

Conflicting are of:

1. Attributes.
2. Pre-conditions.
3. Limits.
4. Quantity.
5. Restriction.
6. Exceptions.
7. Time.
8. Place.
9. Persons.
10. Reason.

“General” [statements]: A word that encompasses all [possibilities] that are suitable to it, in a single coinage, without limit: linguistic, colloquial, intellectual.

It is one of the attributes of the utterance.

Its indication is: [a judgement that is] exhaustive and universal, not [a judgement on a] group, nor a [judgement on an] aggregate.

Its indication falling upon the lowest amount needed to make it true is known with certainty, and it falling upon every single instance specifically is known probabilistically.

The generality of individuals necessitates the generality of situations, times, and location.

Specification is the exclusion of some of the apparent [instances] of the utterance from the intent and the judgment.

It is valid up until the lowest amount of the indication of the utterance. It is said until one [remains] even if it is [specification of] a group.

The general [group that is] specified is literal and the group meant to be specified is figurative because it is a universal statement being used as a particular.

The specifier:

If it cannot stand alone by itself because it is connected to what is mentioned during the general statement, then it is a connected specifier. For example, linguistic qualifiers.

Otherwise, it is disconnected: such as the intellect or senses.

“Unqualified” [statements] are what indicate multiple within its genus and “qualified” [statements] are opposite to that.

“Definitive” [statements] are what do not imply anything except for one meaning it was coined for.

“Apparent” [statements] are what imply two meanings with one of them being more preponderant than the other in terms of what it was coined for.

“Interpretation” is the ascription of the utterance to the weaker meaning using a proof. It is either valid or invalid.

The valid [interpretation] is either plausible or implausible.

“Ambiguous” [statements] are ones whose indication is not clear because of multiple possibilities in the absence of preponderance.

“Clarification” is the transition of something from the domain of vagueness to the domain of clarity.

“Abrogation” is the lifting of a Divine Ruling with an Address.

The Sunnah

[The Sunnah] is a statement of the Prophet ﷺ, and his actions, and his tacit approval, because he never tacitly approved of someone on misguidance.

His ﷺ actions were never prohibited [Haram] due to [his] infallibility, nor disliked [Makruh] due to the command to follow them.

His innate actions were permissible [Mubah] in relation to him ﷺ and us.

If it bears the possibility of being innate or legislative, which one of them should be assumed? Irresolution.

[Actions that are] distinct to him are clear.

The clarification of what he legislated follows what it was meant to clarify.

The repeated [action]’s ruling is like the first.

What is other than that, if its ruling is known, then his nation is like him.

If it is unknown but its possibilities are restricted: dissenting opinions.

Reports:

Either they are certainly known to be lies.

Or certainly known to be truthful. Among them is a mass transmitted report and the knowledge acquired from it is known self-evidently. It is [also] said: contemplatively.

Or, it is strongly suspected to be true, which is the report of an upright narrator. From it is the widely-transmitted report and it is [a report] widespread from one source. It does not offer certainty except with an external confirmation.

It is obligatory to act by it in legal edicts and testimony, according to scholarly consensus and likewise in all other worldly affairs. It is said, [according to] transmission, and it is said [according to] intellectual reasoning.

Scholarly Consensus

[Scholarly consensus] is the agreement of mujtahids from the nation of the Prophet ﷺ after him during a time on a matter.

It must have a basis.

It is a proof in the Divine Law with certainty, and contradicting it is impermissible.

In the admissibility of a tacit consensus and its being a true scholarly consensus, there is hesitation.

Adhering to the minimum of what is opined gives certainty.

Analogical Reasoning

[Analogical reasoning] is the affixation of an unknown situation to a situation whose ruling is known due to a common factor between them that necessitates that ruling.

Its pillars are four:

1. The source
2. The basis
3. The branch
4. The ruling

The source: it is the locus of the ruling, the vehicle of the analogy. Its preconditions are:

Its preconditions are:

1. Sureness of its ruling.
2. Its ruling not being abrogated.
3. And not being specific such as the testimony of Khuzayma,
4. [And not] something whose meaning cannot be understood, such as amounts.

5. [And not] something whose meaning can be understood but it has no analogs.
6. And the source not being a branch of another source.
7. And the agreement on the ruling not be predicated upon the combination of two attributes and each group claims that their attribute is the reason. This is composite analogy.

As for the basis: It is the defining factor and it is an outward attribute- not a hidden one- firmly established.

In the precondition of uniformity, reversibility, and transitivity, there is a difference of opinion.

There is no difference of opinion in the basing of a ruling of something existent on an existent attribute,

and a non-existent [ruling] on an absent [attribute].

In the basing of something existent on something absent, there is a difference of opinion.

As for basing of something non-existent on something existent, this is defined as basing by preclusions.

And is the presence of the requisites a precondition for basis through it because the absence of the ruling when the reason within it is not present is due the absence of it, not due to the existence of the preclusion?

Or not, because if the preclusion has an effect during the presence of the requisites, then it is even more fitting [to have an effect] in their absence?

For the basis, there are ways:

The first: Definitive statements; distinct and indicatives.

Distinct: mentioning the statement of the reason.

For indicatives, there are levels:

• The mentioning of the attribute alongside the ruling such that it is far-fetched that it was mentioned for other than to give the explanation.
• The mentioning of a known attribute due to which the answer was elicited. Were it not to be for explanation, the mentioning would be empty of any purpose.
• The mentioning of the ruling right after knowledge of the occurrence.
• The transmission of the narrator an action that originated from the lawgiver or other than him that elicited the ruling from the lawgiver.

The second: Scholarly consensus.

The third: Correlation. It is the situation of the ruling being such that there is an attribute interrelated to the ruling.

Then, the correlating factor:

1. Either it is the explicit statement of the Divine Law to consider its existence in the existence of the ruling, and it is [named] the “causal factor”.
2. Or, its existence in the genus of the ruling, or its genus in the existence of the ruling, or its genus in the genus of the ruling, and it is [named] the “expedient factor”.
3. Or, there is no explicit statement to consider it but the ruling is established only in agreement with it in a situation. It is named the “remote factor.”
4. Otherwise, it is the “exigent factor.”

The fourth: interdependency. It is the existence of a ruling along with existence of the attribute and the absence of it [the ruling] in the absence of it.

The fifth: resemblance. It is the wavering of the matter between two differing principles but its resemblance with one of them is stronger.

The sixth: consistency. It is the establishment of the ruling with the attribute where there is no contradiction therein.

Whoever does not consider interdependency, it is more fitting that they do not consider this [consistency] either.

As for the branch: It is the thing ruled by the vehicle (the source).

Its preconditions are:

1. Existence of the reason in it in its entirety.
2. Its ruling does not precede the source.
3. It does not differ from it in rulings, such as sales with marriage.
4. It is not explicitly stated to be a subset or superset [of the source].

As for the ruling:

from among its preconditions is that it is a religious ruling, where certainty is not demanded in it.

In its being habitual, linguistic, or rational, there is a difference of opinion based on the permissibility of analogy in these matters and the prohibition in them.

Legal Reasoning

[Legal reasoning] is a proof that is neither a textual statement, nor scholarly consensus, nor analogical reasoning.

It includes:

1. Categorical and Conditional Syllogisms.
2. Induction.
3. Negation of [trivial] differences.
4. Linkage.
5. The existence of an impetus, hindrance, or absence of a precondition.
6. Presumption of continuity.
7. The Law of those before us.
8. The school of thought of a Companion.
9. Juristic discretion.
10. Public exigency, as previously mentioned.